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ex rel. Thompson v. Price, 79 Sup. Ct. 295 (1958), the defendant
in the principal case was denied certiorari, but no reasons for the
denial were given. Therefore, it is not known if the Pennsylvania
practice has been sanctioned or condemned.
J. F. W., Jr.

CONsTrTrtmrONAL LAw-FREmom OF THE PEmss-TEsTmONY

PFW-

ILEGE OF JouENALiST.-P brought action against broadcasting company for allegedly false and defamatory statements made about
her by a "network executive" and published by defendant newspaper columnist. The district court held defendant in criminal
contempt for refusing to testify to the identity of the "network
executive" who was indicated to be the source of the allegedly
defamatory statement in her column. Defendant, claiming this to
be a confidential communication, appealed. Held, that the first
amendment, guaranteeing freedom of the press, does not confer an
evidentiay privilege on a journalist to refuse to identify the source
of an allegedly defamatory statement. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1958).
The claim of the defendant in this case of a privilege from
testifying as to the source of her publication presents a twofold
problem. The two legal theories on which the defendant claimed
such a privilege in the principal case are those most frequently
proposed in cases of this nature. They are: (1) the guarantee of
freedom of the press contained in the first amendment; and (2) a
privilege from testifying as a rule of evidence.
The contention with which the court was most concerned in
the resolution of the principal case was the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of the press. On this ground, there seems little doubt
that the court accurately and soundly applied the law. The guarantees of the constitution are liberally applied, and broad scope is
given to them. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943);
Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950). Authors
and publishers are entitled to a high degree of protection from accountability for their publications. Baure v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 820 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115 (1946). But it has long been
recognized that freedom of the press is not an absolute freedom. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). It is primarily
a freedom from prior restraint. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
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These broad principles of constitutional law are to be considered together with the principle that one of the incidents of
judicial power is the obligation of witnesses to testify, and the correlative right of litigants to enlist judicial compulsion of such testimony. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). It is true that to
some extent the enforcement of this duty is bound to impinge on
the constitutional freedoms of both press and speech. But the courts
have stated that such personal sacrifice on the part of a witness is a
necessary contribution of the citizen to the general welfare. Blair
v. United States, supra. The general policy of the courts, then, is to
require the disclosure of all information necessary to see that justice
prevails. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County,
269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). In view of this policy, it would
seem that neither the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
nor freedom of press would afford a journalist the absolute right to
refrain from testifying.
In absence of a constitutional sanction for a privilege from
testifying, the defendant's position in the principal case rested on
the second contention of an evidentiary immunity as a rule of evidence. While this was not the primary ground on which the defendant made her appeal, this contention has certainly become the focal
point of the dispute that has surrounded this case. The basic contention of the "fourth estate" in their vociferous support of the
defendant's position is not only that requiring such testimony violates the unwritten journalist's code of ethics, but that statutory
protection herein is necessary to insure effective news service.
Much emphasis has been placed on the court's strong recognition of the standards enunciated in the journalist's code of ethics.
It has, for instance, been held to be libel to publish the false statement that a journalist violated the confidence of an informant.
Tryon v. Evening News Assoc., 39 Mich. 686 (1878). But when
information given in such confidence is considered from the point
of view of the rules of evidence, the weight attached to the libel
cases is greatly weakened. The universal rule is that the mere fact
that a statement is made in pursuance of an express or implied relation of confidence does not create a privilege from testifying - that
ethical restraints are not synonymous with legal restraints. 8 WicMoRE, EvIDENcE § 2286 (3d ed. 1940). In the case of People ex rel.
Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, the court stated the rule:
"The policy of the law is to require the disclosure of all information by witnesses in order that justice may prevail. The granting
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of such a privilege from such disclosure constitutes an exception to
that general rule .... The tendency is not to extend the classes
to whom the privilege from disclosure is granted, but to restrict
that privilege." At 295, 199 N.E. at 416.
In absence of a statute granting such immunity, the courts rarely
extend this privilege beyond the common law protection to private
communications between husband and wife and between attorney
and client. McMann v. S.E.C., 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1987). Even
when statutes establishing further evidentiary privileges are adopted,
being in derogation of the common law, they are strictly construed.
Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 189, 123 A.2d 473 (1956).
Wigmore notes, however, that by statute, this privilege has been extended beyond its common law limitations in some states to include
communications to such classes as journalists, clerks, trustees, brokers, radio and television personnel, and others. 8 WiGmome, EVIDENCE
§ 2286. The most frequent statutory extension of this privilege, however, has been to journalists, with the following twelve states now
granting such a privilege: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 8 WiGmoRE, EVMENCE § 2286.
The range of these statutes is extensive. Some grant an absolute
and unqualified privilege for refusing to testify as to the source of
the publication. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN.tit 28, § 330 (1950). Most
of the statutes are, however, qualified. An example is ARK. ANN.
STAT. tit. 43, § 917 (1951), which provides:
"Before an editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper or
periodical, or publisher... shall be required to disclose... to
any... authority, the source of information used as a basis for
any article he may have written or published, it must be shown
that such article was written and published in bad faith, with
malice, and not in the interest of public welfare."
Such legislative extensions of the evidentiary privilege, as noted
by Wigmore, are generally at the instance of organized pressure
groups for their own protection and in pursuit of their own interests.
8 WIGmoBE, EvmENcE § 2286. While it cannot be denied that such
self-serving reasons may well have been the basis of the legislation,
and while the underlying hesitancy of the courts to extend the privilege in the absence of a statute is founded on the recognized evils
that often result from the suppression of evidence, the statutes, it
is believed, are not without merit.
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To grant a statutory immunity, four elements are said to be
necessary: (1) Communications must originate in the confidence
that they will not be disclosed; (2) the element of confidentiality
must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintainance of the relation of the parties; (3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be fostered; (4) the injury that
would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 8 WicMoRE, EViDENCE § 2286.
The first two elements herein seem clearly to be present in some
form by witness of the public support of the privilege such as this
principal case has aroused, and from the recent trend of statutory
development as noted above. In the same manner, the third prerequisite is also to that degree satisfied. The alleged absence of the
fourth element has been the cause of the refusal of the courts and
legislatures to extend the privilege to journalists. While the requirement of testimony is necessary to the public interest in seeking out
all facts necessary to do justice in each case, in many instances, such
as the exposing of public corruption, wherein the information would
often be unobtainable without the guarantee of protection of the
confidential source, the journalist is actually aiding the administration of justice -through the right of concealment of his source. It
must further be admitted that the absolute rule against protection of
such communication tends to a silencing of many news sources. Regarding the problem of the balance of interests in the fourth element,
it must also be admitted that the public interest in the testimony of
all persons would at times be outweighed by the disclosure of information of a genuine public concern that could only be obtained
by a partial restriction of the absolute duty to testify.
In the example of the Arkansas statute quoted above, it is felt
that the qualifications therein, that the publication be without "bad
faith" or "malice", and that it "be in the interest of public welfare",
would adequately allow for a free and unhampered gathering of such
news as is in the genuine public interest, while furnishing the necessary essence of the judicial and litigatory benefits of the common
law rule against such a privilege.
There was no statute in New York allowing a journalistic privilege and hence the court disallowed the defendant's contention.
There is also no such statute in West Virginia at this time. Thus
three basic alternatives would be present in these states: (1) continuance of the common law, disallowing the privilege; (2) granting
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by statute of an absolute privilege; (8) or the enactment of a statute
granting a qualified privilege.
The storm of controversy that the principal case has fomented
has found support for each of these several alternatives. In the tone
of the policy discussion that has arisen around this case, which by
now greatly overshadows -thelegal controversy involved, the writer,
while subscribing to the correctness of the decision itself, would
espouse the enactment of statutes granting the qualified privilege.
L. B. S.
CONSTruTTIONAL LAw-S_,RCH AND S

unE-GIr

OF PMVACY

OF T=E Ho~m.-Petitioner refused to permit a duly authorized

municipal housing inspector to enter and make an inspection of his
home pursuant to a housing standard ordinance of Dayton, Ohio.

The ordinance provided for the inspection of dwellings at any reasonable hour to determine their condition for the purpose of safe-

guarding the health and safety of the occupants of dwellings and
the general public. It also fixed a penalty for refusal to allow inspection. Petitioner was convicted of violating the ordinance and
applied for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the ordinance
violated both the federal and state constitutional provisions against

unreasonable search and seizure. The court of appeals denied the
writ. Held, on appeal, that the city ordinance was a valid exercise

of police power, and as such was not violative of the Ohio constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. State ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 151 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio 1958).
The problem presented by the principal case is the conflict
between the privacy of an individual in his home as guaranteed
by constitutional provisions against unreasonable search and seizure
and the police power of the municipality in the regulation of public
health, safety and welfare. The maxim that "every man's home is
his castle" has been fashioned as a part of the constitutional law of
the United States by the fourth amendment and similar provisions
against unreasonable searches and seizures in state constitutions.
"The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not
protection against self incrimination; itwas the common-law right of
a man to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the indispensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization."

Dis-

trict of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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